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Ian Fillmore
Price Discrimination and 
Public Policy in the U.S. 
College Market
Each year, over 80 percent of 
incoming college freshmen in the United 
States complete the Free Application 
for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). 
The FAFSA collects detailed financial 
information as well as a list of colleges 
where the student is considering 
attending. The government uses the 
FAFSA information to determine 
eligibility for federal aid, but because it 
lacks the logistical capacity to dispense 
aid on its own, it enlists colleges as 
partners in distributing federal dollars 
to college students. In the process, the 
colleges a student lists on her application 
receive full access to the student’s FAFSA 
information, including information 
about the student’s family income and 
the number of potential competitors the 
college is facing. This partnership of 
sharing FAFSA information with colleges 
has been treated as a mere administrative 
detail by students, parents, policymakers, 
and even economists. It is not. As I 
demonstrate, colleges use the FAFSA to 
engage in substantial price discrimination 
with widespread repercussions for the 
cost of a college education as well as 
the equilibrium sorting of students into 
colleges. 
Colleges in the United States charge 
high sticker prices but routinely offer 
discounts of varying sizes to their 
students, which means that students 
at the same college often pay vastly 
different prices for the same education. 
These discounts can be sizable and are 
intended to influence the student’s choice 
of which college to attend. For instance, 
if a college has a posted sticker price of 
$20,000 per year but it offers a student a 
$15,000 discount, the relevant transaction 
price is not $20,000 but $5,000. Each 
college offers a similar “price quote’’ to 
the student, and she chooses the college 
that makes her the most attractive 
offer, taking into account other college 
characteristics that she values in addition 
to price.1 
Colleges care about the FAFSA 
because it provides them with a source 
of low-cost, high-quality information 
about a student’s willingness-to-pay. 
The information is low-cost because the 
federal government bears the burden 
of collecting it, and it is high-quality 
because the government imposes fines or 
jail time for misreporting information on 
the FAFSA. Moreover, the application 
comes bundled with a convenient 
monitoring technology for ensuring that 
its information is reliable. Thirty percent 
of FAFSA forms are automatically 
audited using IRS tax data. If a student’s 
application is not randomly selected 
for audit, then that student’s college 
has full discretion to flag it for audit 
anyway. Indeed many colleges simply 
flag all of their students’ FAFSA forms.2 
Effectively, the FAFSA grants colleges 
generous access to the IRS and other 
government databases and allows them 
to use that information to learn about a 
student’s willingness-to-pay. 
Is sharing the FAFSA with colleges 
a good policy choice? Specifically, 
what would happen to prices, student-
college sorting, and welfare if colleges 
could not use it to price discriminate? 
To answer these questions I build and 
estimate a model of college pricing using 
student-level data from the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study. 
I then use my estimates to simulate 
counterfactuals wherein colleges are 
unable to use the FAFSA to price 
discriminate and find that there would be 
four primary consequences.
First, with less ability to distinguish 
between low and high willingness-to-pay 
students, prices would vary less across 
students. I estimate that the variance 
in transaction prices among students at 
the same elite college would fall by 19 
percent.3 
Second, transaction prices at elite 
colleges would fall by $826 per student 
per year, and consequently student 
welfare would rise. However, the change 
in prices would vary by income so that 
students with parent adjusted gross 
income of about $37,000 would see no 
change in transaction price, those with 
higher incomes would see their prices 
fall, and those with lower incomes would 
actually see their prices rise.4 Looking at 
it differently, colleges use the FAFSA to 
price discriminate in a way that amounts 
to a 2 percent income tax coupled with 
a $723 rebate, so the lowest income 
students receive the rebate, but it is taxed 
away as income rises. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1, which plots average change 
in a student’s transaction price (relative 
to baseline) as a function of her parents’ 
adjusted gross income. Thus, colleges 
use the FAFSA to charge wealthier 
students more and poorer students less, 
effectively using higher-income students 
to subsidize lower-income students. 
Nevertheless, Table 1 demonstrates that 
colleges only redistribute 35 percent of 
the “tax revenue” they raise from using 
the FAFSA to other students in the form 
of lower prices; the remaining 65 percent 
accrues to the colleges in the form of 
higher tuition revenue. 
Colleges only redistribute 
35 percent of the “tax revenue” 
they raise from using the 
FAFSA to other students in 
the form of lower prices; the 
remaining 65 percent accrues 
to the colleges in the form of 
higher tuition revenue.
Colleges care about the 
FAFSA because it provides 
them with a source of low-cost, 
high-quality information about 
a student’s willingness-to-pay.
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The third consequence of preventing 
colleges from using the FAFSA to price 
discriminate is that 12.5 percent of 
students who are currently attending elite 
colleges would be inefficiently priced 
out of the elite market and would attend 
a nonelite college. This occurs because 
colleges are no longer able to tailor their 
prices as precisely. These mismatched 
students consist of a mixture of low-
income students and high-income, low-
ability students. 
Fourth, without direct information on 
income, colleges will use other student 
characteristics to engage in statistical 
discrimination, which will tend to 
reduce prices for minority students as 
well as curtail merit-based aid (since 
students with high test scores also tend 
to have higher incomes). These results 
all illustrate the extent to which giving 
colleges access to FAFSA information 
has affected the sorting of students into 
elite and nonelite colleges, the prices 
students pay, and the way those prices 
vary across different types of students.
In summary, the federal government 
has made a policy choice to share 
FAFSA information with colleges. This 
arrangement has been viewed as an 
administrative detail by students, parents, 
policymakers, and even economists. My 
FAFSA information restricted
Parent income
Number of 
colleges listed All FAFSA info
Bottom third ($) 212 −242 428
Middle third ($) −493 −361 −538
Top third ($) −1,908 −471 −2,312
Percent of “tax revenue” transferred 
to other students (%)
17.0 45.8 35.4
NOTE: When colleges can no longer use the FAFSA to price discriminate, some students see their prices rise, 
relative to baseline, while others see their prices fall. Each cell in the first three rows reports the average change 
in price for students in the corresponding tercile of the distribution of parent adjusted gross income. The final 
row reports the change in price for those who see their prices rise, divided by the change in price for those who 
see their prices fall. This measures the degree to which colleges use FAFSA information to price discriminate in 
a way that redistributes money from some students to others, versus simply boosting tuition revenues.
Table 1  Price Change Relative to Baseline by Income Group
Figure 1  Change in Price If FAFSA Information Is Restricted
NOTE: The fitted values plotted here come from regressing the estimated change in price relative 
to baseline on parent adjusted gross income (included as a fourth-order polynomial). No other 
covariates were included.
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results demonstrate that this seemingly 
unimportant administrative detail is 
actually an important policy lever that 
should be part of the current debate 
around redesigning our federal financial 
aid system. Taken as a whole, I find that 
although allowing colleges to use FAFSA 
information does increase efficiency 
somewhat and lower prices for some 
students, its main effect is to boost tuition 
revenue, primarily at the expense of 
middle- and high-income students.
Notes
1. Most high school seniors complete 
the FAFSA at the same time as their college 
applications. A primary reason for doing this 
is so they can compare price offers when 
choosing which college to attend. Research 
by van der Klaauw (2002) demonstrates 
that these discounts are indeed effective at 
attracting students.
2. It appears to be public knowledge that 
many colleges verify all of their FAFSA forms 
(Grant 2006; Weston 2014).
3. Elite colleges consist of four-year 
private colleges plus very selective public 
colleges (which roughly correspond to 
flagship state schools). Nonelite colleges then 
consist of less-selective and non-selective 
public colleges.
4. Roughly 30 percent of students at elite 
colleges have parent adjusted gross income 
below $36,886.
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